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Convention Theory, Classification and Quantification 
Rainer Diaz-Bone ∗ 
Abstract: »Konventionentheorie, Klassifikation und Quantifizierung«. The arti-
cle presents the main contributions of the French approach of economics of 
convention (EC) to the analysis of classifications and quantifications. Here, 
Alain Desrosières has delivered many outstanding contributions. The article 
shortly presents the approach of EC. Conventions are socio-cognitive resources 
actors rely on to achieve shared interpretations, evaluations and valuations of 
situations and the value of objects, persons and actions. Also, the interpretation 
of institutions has to apply conventions. Conventions with semantic content 
and without semantic content are compared, and the different scopes of con-
vention-based coordination (in time and space) are discussed. Also the concep-
tion of a political economy of classification and quantification is presented. At 
the end of the article, a typology of situations of classifications and quantifica-
tions is introduced. 
Keywords: Economics of convention, institutions, classifications, quantifica-
tions, semantic content of conventions, neoliberalism. 
1.  Introduction 
This contribution focuses on the outstanding contribution of Alain Desrosières 
to the analysis of classification and quantification (Desrosières 1998, 2008, 
2008a, 2014).1 Desrosières’ work is closely linked to the scientific movement 
of the so-called “economics of convention” (in French économie des conven-
tions) – in short EC –, which has been developed in the last three decades in the 
Paris region (Desrosières 2011; Salais 2012; Diaz-Bone 2015). Today, EC can 
be regarded as a core element of the new French social sciences (Dosse 1999; 
Nachi 2006; Corcuff 2011). Also, EC has been developed as a transdisciplinary 
and complex pragmatic institutionalism, focusing mainly on processes of eco-
nomic coordination and collective assignment of worth to products, services 
but also to other objects and persons (Salais and Thévenot 1986; Favereau and 
Lazega 2002; Eymard-Duvernay 2006, 2006a; Diaz-Bone 2011, 2015, Bati-
                                                             
∗  Rainer Diaz-Bone, Department of Sociology, University of Lucerne, Frohburgstrasse 3, 6002 
Lucerne, Switzerland; rainer.diazbone@unilu.ch. 
1  See also the contributions in Emmanuel Didier and Jean-Jacques Droesbeke, eds. (2014) and 
Didier (2016, in this HSR Special Issue). 
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foulier et al. 2016).2 From the viewpoint of EC, competent actors rely on con-
ventions to achieve shared interpretations in situations as a precondition to 
realize a collective goal. From its beginnings, EC has analyzed the significance 
of conventions as foundations for social processes of classification and quanti-
fication. Also, EC has connected categories and quantifications (fig-
ures/numbers) to the far-reaching and convention-based social coordination in 
which institutions (organizations, rules) are embedded. This approach includes 
innovative perspectives on classification and quantification, but links these 
processes also to the foregoing and the following social phenomena. In this 
article some of the main contributions to the analysis of classification and 
quantification of EC will be presented and discussed. But also some open ques-
tions and perspectives will be discussed. 
2.  Convention Theory 
At the core of a convention is the attention to economic coordination out of 
which economic institutions, values and entities (products) emerge. Instead of 
postulating pre-given needs, resources, evaluations and product qualities – as 
transaction cost economics does –, EC regards convention-based coordination 
as the real ground of all these ontologies. And EC assumes a plurality of possi-
ble ways to structure these coordinations. There is no single “most effective” or 
“optimal” convention for economic production, distribution and consumption. 
The two monographs “On Justification” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) and 
“Worlds of Production” (Storper and Salais 1997) introduced two sets of con-
ventions which were introduced on the basis of more general principles.3 And 
all the introduced conventions share the character as logics of coordination 
which provide actors a shared frame of interpretation, evaluation and valuation 
for the worth of goods, objects and persons. In these books, these conventions 
are presented as “orders of justification” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) or 
“worlds of production” (Storper and Salais 1997). This way, the emphasis of 
the convention-based coordination is placed on the normativity of coordination 
or on the collective intentionality of production. For EC, competent actors are 
able to evaluate the appropriateness of conventions in situations and they are 
regarded as competent to switch or to reconcile conventions. Examples for such 
conventions are the domestic convention, the industrial convention and the 
market convention. The domestic convention can be related to craftsmanship. 
                                                             
2  See also the special issue of Revue économique 40 (2) from 1989 which introduced the 
notion “économie des conventions.”  
3  There are two other important monographs for EC which were later worked out. These are 
“The New Spirit of Capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006) and “The Empire of Value” 
(Orléan 2014). 
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Here, in small and family-based companies actors bring in the traditional ways of 
production, manual labor and personal experience to generate unique specimens. 
The industrial convention structures the coordination of scientifically controlled 
and planned mass production. Quantification and a high degree of division of 
labor are important principles. While the first two conventions have a long-term 
orientation, the market convention provides a short-term orientation. Actors are 
oriented towards individual needs and (changing) prices. The civic convention 
engages in equal rights and values actors who engage in public affairs. Actors 
relying on the green convention are looking for the protection of nature’s integ-
rity and they value products and actions applying this criterion. 
There are more identified conventions as the network convention or the in-
spired convention. All are influential ways of coordination in the economy 
which cannot be reduced to one convention alone (Storper and Salais 1997; 
Boltanski and Thévenot 2006).4 
Every modern approach has to deal with the two mega paradigms in the so-
cial sciences: pragmatism and structuralism. The perspective on conventions as 
structuring resources for competent actors indicates that EC relates pragmatist 
and structuralist traditions to work out a new pragmatic institutionalism. Ob-
jects and cognitive formats are included in theorizing and empirical analysis, 
because from the standpoint of EC they have an impact on coordination in 
situations. A pragmatic theorem is the difference between institutions and 
conventions. The reason is that institutions’ meaning (the meaning of rules, 
standards, law etc.) for coordinating actors is conceived as incomplete which 
explains why conventions achieve their character as pragmatic resources for the 
usages of institutions.5 
In fact, EC is unique in another regard: although it was founded by five 
economists – namely François Eymard-Duvernay, Olivier Favereau, André 
Orléan, Robert Salais and Laurent Thévenot – EC has been from its beginning 
a transdisciplinary scientific movement. EC integrated concepts, methods and 
research perspectives from history, statistics, sociology, educational science, 
health science, political science and law.6 Today, there is a third and interdisci-
plinary generation of representatives in France and EC has become an interna-
tional transdisciplinary approach including a growing amount of researchers 
outside of France (Diaz-Bone 2015).7 
                                                             
4  All these conventions empirically occur not in their pure and ideal versions. That is the 
reason why Michael Storper and Robert Salais use the notion of “possible worlds of produc-
tion” (Storper and Salais 1997). Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot have worked out the 
tensions, compromises and combinations of the identified conventions (Boltanski and Thé-
venot 2006). 
5  For a discussion of this difference see Salais (1998) and Diaz-Bone (2012). 
6  See actually the dictionary “Dictionnaire des conventions” (Batifoulier et al. 2016). 
7  As is documented by the contributions in the following issues of Historical Social Research: 
Rainer Diaz-Bone and Robert Salais, eds., 2011, Conventions and Institutions from a Histori-
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3.  Classification and Metric Measurement 
One of the birth moments of EC was the analysis of social and institutional 
practices of classifications.8 At the French national institute for statistics and 
economic analysis (INSEE), Alain Desrosières and Laurent Thévenot (1979) 
started a methodological analysis of principles of social classifications. At the 
end of the 1970s, INSEE was an exceptional institution for transdisciplinary 
research on (statistical) categories, (social) class, categorization and classifica-
tion.9 INSEE can be regarded as a birth place of EC.10 The new department for 
labor (“division emploi”) – headed by Robert Salais – was in charge of devel-
oping new approaches for the analysis of labor, unemployment and labor insti-
tutions (Salais 2008; Diaz-Bone 2015). Salais and collaborators reconstructed 
the upcoming of the labor category of “unemployed” in the evolution of the 
industrial organization in France (Salais et al. 1986). They showed that the 
category co-evolved with the upcoming of new labor institutions and a new 
interpretation of long-lasting labor relations (industrial labor contract, insur-
ances, etc.). At INSEE, Desrosières and Thévenot were charged to prepare the 
reform of the French socio-professional categories – which in France had been 
widely used since the 1950s and were cognitive references in the French mass 
media and in the French population since then (Desrosières and Thévenot 
2002; Amossé 2013, 2016). Research at INSEE continued foregoing traditions, 
such as the work of Durkheim and Bourdieu on social classes and categories, 
but also the studies on industrial and professional categories (see Diaz-Bone 
2015).11 One result of these studies was the identification of the conventional 
                                                                                                                                
cal Perspective, Special Issue of Historical Social Research 36 (4); Rainer Diaz-Bone and 
Robert Salais, eds., 2012, The Économie des Conventions – Transdisciplinary Discussions and 
Perspectives, Focus of Historical Social Research 37 (4); and Rainer Diaz-Bone, Claude Didry, 
and Robert Salais, eds., 2015, Law and Conventions from a Historical Perspective, Special 
Issue of Historical Social Research 40 (1); all issues are available at <http://www.gesis. 
org/en/hsr/archive>. 
8  Another starting point was the analysis of labor and labor institutions, see Salais and Thé-
venot (1986), also Salais et al. (1986). 
9  The notions "categorization" and "classification" are often used assuming similar meanings. 
But categorization emphasizes the process of assigning an entity (individual, event, object 
etc.) to a category, while classifying also emphasis the process of valuing an entity by relat-
ing it to a class. In the social sciences the meaning of the word “class” denotes also social 
groups while the word “category” does not have this strong semantic relationship to social 
entities. The notion of “classification” denotes the process of classifying but also the archi-
tecture of the system of categories or classes – the latter is not part of the semantic con-
tent of “categorization.” 
10  INSEE stands for the “Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques" 
<http://www.insee.fr>. 
11  There was also established research at INSEE, see the contributions of Bernard Guibert, Jean 
Laganier and Michel Volle (1971) and also from Michel Volle (1982). 
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and historical character of categories and classifications.12 No social classifica-
tion can be built only on logical principles alone and no social classification 
can be built on empirical data alone. Desrosières (1998) has invented the con-
cept of the “equivalence principle” as the implicit logic upon which categories 
and classifications (as their systematic arrangement) are based. Also, 
Desrosières brought in the concept of “equivalence space,” which is the politi-
cal and geographical scope of categories and classifications (Desrosières 1998; 
Didier 2016). In the succession of Durkheim and Bourdieu, it was evident for 
Desrosières, Boltanski, Salais and Thévenot that categories of the official ad-
ministration are related to the symbolic struggles of social groups who want to 
achieve their group being represented and established as a category in the offi-
cial statistical classifications e.g. the official system of professional groups 
(Diaz-Bone 2015). And vice versa, the conventionalists identified how the 
existing categories of official statistical classification were enacted by different 
actors and through a chain of coordinations as in the case of official surveys as 
powerful representations in the social space (Thévenot 1983; Desrosières 
2007).13 Since then, the social conventions, underlying categories and surveys 
have been a continuous research interest of EC (Thévenot 2011, 2016). Anoth-
er strand of research scrutinized the pragmatics of classification by arranging 
so-called “experiments,” which were situations in which individuals had to 
classify (to categorize) persons having only incomplete information about 
them. This way, Boltanski and Thévenot brought classifying individuals in 
situations in which they had to explain and to justify their practices (Penissat et 
al. 2016). Soon, it turned out that these individuals referred to more general 
principles when they had to justify their ways of classification as ways of valu-
ing classified persons – at this moment in the 1980s Boltanski and Thévenot 
became aware of the “orders of justification” (Boltanski and Thévenot 1983, 
2006). Another important concept which was developed in the context of this 
research on statistical categories and classifications is the concept of “invest-
ment in form” (Eymard-Duvernay and Thévenot 1983, 1983a; Thévenot 1984). 
But actors also need a cognitive instrumentation to rely on when they coordi-
nate and actors have to invest in forms i.e. to construct them as equipment for 
coordination. Forms enhance the scope in time (duration) and space (range) of 
convention-based coordinations. Statistical categories can be conceived as one 
sort of such forms.  
French conventionalists first gained access to the sociology of quantification 
analyzing classifications and of categories which are regarded as the basis of 
counts of classified individuals. As Espeland and Stevens (2008) remarked, one 
can understand categorization and classification as basic forms of measurement 
on the measurement level of nominal scale (which they name “marking”). They 
                                                             
12  Many results are documented in the two volumes edited by Joëlle Affichard (1977, 1987). 
13  Laurent Thévenot compiled a set of research contributions (INSEE 1981). 
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refer to Hubert Blalock’s presentation of the nominal scale. Blalock related this 
measurement level to classifications. 
Classification is fundamental to any science. All other levels of measurement, 
no matter how precise, basically involve classification as a minimal operation. 
We therefore can consider classification to be the lowest level of measurement 
as the term is used in its broadest sense. For example, we place Presbyterians 
and Catholics in distinct categories, but we do not imply that one is greater 
than or better than the other. As long as the categories are exhaustive (include 
all cases) and non-overlapping or mutually exclusive (no case in more than 
one category), we have the minimal conditions necessary for the application 
of statistical procedures. The term nominal scale has been used to refer to this 
simplest level of measurement (Blalock 1972, 16). 
In contrast to the statistics textbook, conventionalists’ research was interested 
in the historical emergence and the pragmatic handlings of these categories. 
From EC’s perspective, it is problematic to equalize classifications and the 
nominal scale. The reason is that EC studies empirical social classifications 
(instead of analytic variables defined by statisticians). Social classifications can 
have many different levels (organized in main categories and subcategories) 
and be based on a complex arrangement of many dimensions – while a scale 
must be unidimensional. As an institutionalist approach, EC recovers also the 
social foundations of classifications and categories. There are two main argu-
ments: (1) Social categories are based on conventions as underlying social 
principles and (2) conventions – as equivalence principles – interrelate social 
categories and enable the socially recognized architecture of social classifica-
tions (as hierarchies of social categories). 
Measurements at the nominal scale level and higher levels of measurements 
are in some aspects different.14 As Table 1 illustrates, metric scaling results in 
numerical representations while single categories – which can be coded with 
arbitrarily assigned numerical codes – do not have an inherent relation to num-
bers. The exception is categories being counted, but this is already a strategy of 
aggregation.  
  
                                                             
14  Located between the nominal scale and the (two) metric scales (interval and ratio scale), the 
ordinal scale is very common especially in survey data sets. In difference to the nominal 
scale it includes rankings of categories (see Blalock 1972 and Duncan 1984). Here, nominal 
scale and metric scale are discussed because they represent two statistical traditions which 
are related to two different philosophies of the social. George Udny Yule’s perspective on 
statistics was its property to model the categorical reality of societies (and social classes), 
while Karl Pearson’s perspective on statistics was its property to model the continuous reali-
ty of societies, which he believed to be the latent reality underlying categories (Agresti 
2013, 623). 
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Table 1: Categories and Measurements 
 Categories/Classes 
(“nominal scale”) 
Metrics 
(“metric scale”) 
Equivalence Principle categorical identities and their relations scaling procedure 
Forms of Complex  
Arrangements 
classification as system of 
categories/classes 
index as one new  
quantitative representation 
Quantification 
only by aggregation (as 
counts) – numerical codes 
are arbitrarily assigned 
case by case and by  
aggregation 
(E)valuation 
additional/foregoing pro-
cesses are necessary to 
differentiate good and bad 
categories 
hierarchical ranking “built 
in” by metric measurement 
Dependency of  
Representational Context high low 
 
Alain Desrosières had already discussed the differences between categorization 
and (metric) measurement early on (Desrosières 1995). Later he stated that 
quantification is to be composed out of two elements. First a convention must 
be introduced and, second, based on the convention, measurement can be pro-
ceeded (Desrosières 2008, 10). But the main difference between nominal scales 
(“categories”) and metric scales is that metric figures, numbers, have a “built-in 
valuation” (already on the single case level) because the represented infor-
mation enables an immediate evaluation in terms of “more” or “less.” Even 
complex arrangements of metrical measurement as indices offer an immediate 
evaluation because an index is also a numerical representation. In contrast, 
classifications as complex architectures cannot be represented in a simple man-
ner. Actors have to study them, otherwise they will not understand the infor-
mation entailed in single categories and their positioning in the classification. 
The result is that the valid evaluation of representations of categories (even if 
numerically coded) is more dependent on contexts than the evaluation of repre-
sentation of metric measurements. 
4.  Semantic Content and Scope 
However, convention theorists use different notions of convention. And they 
are aware of this different meaning of the notion “convention.” So far, the 
article presented the two important notions of convention which were intro-
duced as orders of justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) or as worlds of 
productions (Storper and Salais 1997). It is important to add now that these two 
versions of conventions in EC are based on underlying principles which help to 
HSR 41 (2016) 2  │  55 
identify acceptable conventions and to delimit orders of justification resp. 
worlds of productions from other principles or devices of coordination.15 EC 
here has introduced structuring and underlying, more general criteria to sys-
tematize the conventions in the two important sets of convention, Boltanski, 
Thévenot, Storper and Salais worked out.16 These conventions offer semantic 
content. They contain – because of the deeper foundation on more general 
principles – a structured meaning which can be adapted to many situations in 
form of explanatory stories. This way, the structural influence on EC articulates 
itself.17 Ordinary actors understand the adequacy of these kinds of conventions 
in situations as socio-culturally established structures. In this sense, actors must 
be practical metaphysicians (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 145).  
But in EC one can identify other usages of the term “convention.” Other 
kinds of conventions are more or less introduced as socially established stand-
ards. What makes these usages of the term interesting but also a problem is 
their missing semantic content. This idea of convention without semantic con-
tent can be illustrated by the highly influential definition provided by David 
Lewis. 
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are 
agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if, in any instance 
of S among members of P, 
(1) everyone conforms to R; 
(2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; 
(3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since S is 
a coordination problem and uniform conformity to R is a proper coordination 
equilibrium in S (Lewis 1969, 42). 
It is striking to see that Lewis does not include semantics (meaningful content, 
semantic structure or discourse) in the definition of the convention R itself, alt-
                                                             
15  Storper and Salais introduced two oppositions to identify four worlds of productions: (1) do 
they produce specialized products or standardized products and (2) do they produce generic 
products or dedicated products? (Storper and Salais 1997, 32 et seq.). Luc Boltanski and 
Laurent Thévenot presented “axioms” for a grammar of orders of justification (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2006, 74 et seq.). These axioms for acceptable orders of justification demand for 
example that all possible members of a “polity” can be identified – which are all human be-
ings who could share an agreement in this world. Other axioms require that all members of 
a polity have principle access to different states of worth and all states of worth can be or-
dered. And it must be mentioned here that both models of conventions postulate conven-
tion-based convention to address a common good. 
16  This is the main difference of EC to other institutionalist approaches who do not offer any 
criteria and whose set of ”logics“ of coordination can be regarded as arbitrary and unsound 
ad hoc-collections of “logics.” This seems to be the case with the approach of “institutional 
logics” (Thornton et al. 2012). For comparisons see Charlotte Cloutier and Ann Langley 
(2013) and Rainer Diaz-Bone (2014). 
17  The structuralist influence on EC is well-remarked in the introduction to the collection 
“Conventions and structures in economic organization” (Favereau and Lazega 2002), see 
Emmanuel Lazega and Olivier Favereau (2002). 
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hough he tried to bring in a foundation for a theory of language! This kind of 
“emptiness” of his notion of convention opens the door for the problem of arbi-
trariness. Olivier Favereau (2008) has started to work out a critique of Lewis’ 
definition, arguing that conventions cannot be reduced to objective and observa-
ble behavior (as a way of conforming) and that conventions need to be regarded 
as regularities in intersubjective actions and beliefs (where the latter are not ob-
servable). Also, Olivier Favereau points to the problem of the importance of 
language use; because conventions have their existence in (collective) language 
use, they have to be represented in language and conventions have to be inter-
preted (2008, 124).18 Important for Favereau’s critique is the distinction he 
makes between “two types of convention, embodying, in the first case, a men-
tal model of a common world, and in the second case, a behavioral model of 
interindividual interaction” (Favereau 2008, 125).19 The identification of differ-
ent kinds of conventions is an important contribution of Favereau’s work. 
But one has to add another element in the critique of Lewis’ concept of con-
vention. Lewis did not consider and analyze the semantic content and the se-
mantic organization of the convention itself – finally conventions without se-
mantic content could become also a “mental model of a common world.”20  
For Lewis, the established practice of driving cars on the right side of the 
street in the US is an example of such a convention (Lewis 1969, 41). There 
will be historical reasons why cars are driven on the right side in the US. But 
this convention is arbitrary in the sense that driving on the right side solves the 
problem of car traffic (which is avoiding accidents) in the same way as driving 
on the left side – as it is the convention in the UK. There is no substantial rea-
son why the US convention should be more legitimate or preferred than the UK 
convention. This rule is a standard which works perfectly well but without 
semantic content that could explain why the right side of the street in the US is 
normative “the right side” and why this convention should be considered as 
superior to another one. The only requirement for this car-driving convention is 
that everybody in the same country sticks to it. But one could easily imagine 
that one convention could be replaced by another one (for whatever reason). 
This would be a costly policy because the convention has prolonged in traffic 
law and the technical design of cars (where the steering wheel is on the oppo-
site side, depending on the convention). So the driving convention could appear 
as justified by its anchoring in law and in technical features. But it would be a 
mistake to believe that the convention itself has enforced its connection to law 
                                                             
18  Independently, François Eymard-Duvernay (2009) has also discussed the foundational 
importance of language use for EC. 
19  See also the proposal of John Latsis (2005) similar to the one of Olivier Favereau (2008). For 
the concept of mental models see Douglass C. North and Arthur Denzau (1994). 
20  André Orléan has proposed to relate the notion of paradigm to EC’s concept of conventions 
(Orléan 1986, 1989, 1999). This is more close to the notion of conventions with semantic 
content. But Orléan does not reflect on the distinction of different kinds of conventions. 
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and technical features. There is no inner relationship between driving on the 
left side in the UK and UK traffic law or UK car-engineering. The car driving 
convention is not able to enforce its extension to other realms. For the UK, one 
could argue that also trains use the right side. But in Switzerland cars are driven 
on the right side of the street while trains use the left track.21 There is no necessity 
to have the same convention for car driving and trains; different conventions 
can be combined and all of them are arbitrary – as their combination is. 
In contrast to conventions without semantic content, conventions with se-
mantic content have an inner potential to enforce a more coherent fitting with 
their social “environment.” Of course, conventions do not enforce themselves, 
but their enacting in a process of coordination also enacts their semantic con-
tent as resource for shared ways of interpretation, evaluation and valuation that 
will work for coordination. These practices can be “shared” and will “work” 
because of their coherence with objects and cognitive formats. This coherence 
is possible when the process of coordination translates the semantic content of 
the convention into this collective practice and into a corresponding result, 
thereby adequately supported by equipment (of objects and cognitive forms) 
which respects and fits to the semantic convention of the convention. 
Conventions with semantic content (which are well combined with object 
and cognitive formats) bring in more power to extend their area of application, 
thereby overarching single situations of coordination and integrating series of 
coordinations.22 
An example to illustrate this “powerful effect” is the study about French 
Camembert production offered by Pierre Boisard and Marie-Thérèse Letablier 
(1987, 1989; Boisard 1991, 2003; Eymard-Duvernay 2004). They compared 
the two coexisting but completely opposite conventions resp. worlds of Cam-
embert production, Camembert distribution and Camembert consumption. 
The traditional way to produce, distribute and consume Camembert expects 
the pre-product milk to be a natural product from traditional Normand cows, 
which entails its seasonal, climate and regional taste. The cheese is produced in 
family-based cheese diaries in a manner which is characterized by craftsman-
ship and traditional knowledge. Milk is regarded as a natural and living sub-
stance. These producers have their distinct milk production, their Norman cows 
and their Norman meadows nearby. Manual labor, personal expertise and re-
gional identity are quality markers for the cheese and its taste. The taste of the 
                                                             
21  In fact, the reason why in Switzerland trains use the left track is that English engineers were 
involved in the establishment of the Swiss railway system. 
22  Here, the notion of convention of EC has some parallels to the concept of “episteme” as 
presented by Michel Foucault (1994). As conventions with semantic content, the concept of 
episteme is a deeper structure and endows knowledge (discourses) and practices with a high 
degree of coherence. And an episteme is conceived to integrate many different discourses 
and to structure them in a coherent way – thereby realizing itself as an overarching and 
deeper structure. See also Diaz-Bone (2013). 
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produced traditional Camembert is varying. It varies not only with season and 
climate but depends also on the tradition of the cheese diary. The cheese is 
certified by regional labels (“certificate of origin”) and distributed to special 
cheese retailers and it is consumed by “connaisseurs” of the French cheese 
tradition. The traditional Camembert cannot be stored for a long time and it is 
to be eaten soon. 
The modern production, distribution and consumption of Camembert as 
mass production are made possible because the milk is supplied from farms all 
over France and the milk is pasteurized and homogenized and transformed into 
a standardized product. The Camembert is produced in cheese factories which 
are equipped with modern food-industry technology and scientific experts, 
controlling the production at every stage. The produced cheese has a standard-
ized taste and it is produced for long duration. Consumers buy it in the super-
markets, appreciate its predictable taste, store it in the refrigerator and eat it 
cold. Here the domestic convention and the industrial convention are opposed 
to each other. They define two completely different ontologies and qualities of 
“Camembert.” In this case, the two quality conventions are able to integrate 
and to govern two different chains of production, distribution and consumption. 
But quality conventions are not always able to “enforce themselves” as a gov-
ernance principle through a whole chain, as the analysis of quality chain has 
demonstrated. Wide-ranging quality chains – like the ones for different sorts of 
coffee – integrate different quality conventions on different segments of the 
chain (Daviron and Ponte 2005; Ponte and Daviron 2005). And it becomes a 
new research topic to analyze how to explain the quality governance of the 
whole chain (Ponte and Sturgeon 2014).  
The scope of conventions can be related to the scope of quantifications 
which are based on conventions. To argue that conventions with semantic 
content have more intrinsic power to extend their scope does not mean to say 
that conventions without semantic content will not realize an extended scope. 
Instead, these conventions gain their potential from their embeddedness in 
networks of objects, practices and cognitive forms as an “extrinsic property.”  
Conventions with semantic content and conventions without semantic con-
tent will be different in regard to their legitimacy and also to the legitimacy of 
quantifications built upon them. The explanation for this is again their content, 
now as order of justification which backup discursive strategies of explanation 
and legitimation. And quality conventions as the industrial convention or the 
market convention which have a close affinity to numbers as cognitive forms 
can be expected to be the most powerful in this regard. To be clear: The argu-
ment developed here is about the convention-based procedures how quantifica-
tion is implemented, i.e. how numerical representations are derived from con-
ventions. It would not be sufficient just to count ex post any kind of 
convention-based phenomena. Conventions without semantic content – and 
quantifications built up on them – will have difficulties to be protected against 
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critique if their arbitrary character is recognized and then reflected as an inade-
quate foundation. Table 2 compares the two kinds of conventions discussed 
here, summarizing some of the relevant different properties they have for EC.  
Table 2: Conventions with Semantic Content and without  
 With 
Semantic Content 
Without 
Semantic Content 
Articulation 
Conventions as logics of 
coordination 
(orders of justification or 
worlds of productions) 
conventions as (pure) 
“standards” 
“Grammar” yes no 
Arbitrary no yes 
Intrinsic Power to Establish 
its Scope (in time/space) high low 
Intrinsic Property to be 
Publicly Recognized as 
Legitimate 
high low 
 
In contrast to other institutionalist approaches, EC has a more skeptical position 
towards theoretical models combining different ontological levels. EC’s meth-
odological position is located beyond methodological individualism and meth-
odological holism. As Storper and Salais (1997) argued, EC tries to place inter-
pretation from the standpoint of actors in situations of coordination. Therefore, 
one could label EC’s methodological position a complex pragmatic situational-
ism (Diaz-Bone 2011, 2015). If EC avoids basing its explanatory power on a 
duality of macro-entities (as “society as a whole”) and micro-entities (individu-
als and their preferences),23 then the concept of “scope” becomes important to 
EC: “our framework [...] challenges the classical macro-micro distinction since 
judgements of worth are precisely ways of enlarging the scope of an evaluation 
from a local context and of crafting generalized statements” (Thévenot 2001, 
418). To extend the range of coordinations in the dimensions of time and space, 
actors rely not only on established and well-known conventions but also on 
intermediaries. Intermediaries (as persons, objects) contribute to the scope of 
conventions from situation to situation (Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal 1997; 
Bessy and Chauvin 2013; Diaz-Bone 2015). 
Theodore Porter (1995) has argued that quantification is a technology of 
communication and of distance, arguing that quantification effectuates trust (as 
                                                             
23  To use such multi-level models (as micro-macro-models or micro-meso-macro-models) 
inevitably brings in the problem of different ontologies located at different levels. But there 
are conditions for the use of such models. (1) These holistic ontologies (macro level) and 
individualistic ontologies (micro level) need to be theorized in a complete and adequate 
manner. (2) These models need to include mechanisms which link the different levels, there-
by respecting the different involved ontologies. In fact, the pragmatist foundation of EC 
contradicts the usage of multi-level models, because pragmatism rejects dualisms. 
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impersonal and objective information) and that numerical information spans 
distance in time and space more easily. 
Standardization is a social strategy and social practice which also is applied 
for the purpose of the extension of scope of coordination (Brunsson and Jacob-
sson 2000; Timmermans and Epstein 2010; Busch 2011; Thévenot 2009, 
2015). Standardization (as normalization) has been studied as a technology of 
power, governance and regulation (Brunsson and Jacobson 2000; Thévenot 
2009; Busch 2011; Ponte et al. 2011), and the work of Michel Foucault is most 
prominent for this perspective (Foucault 1995). Those conventions, which show 
an affinity for standardization via quantification – as the industrial convention 
and the market convention – can rely on this strategy. Conventions that do rely on 
certification – as the green convention and the civic convention – also do extend 
their scope by the implementation of certificates via standardization (and the 
support of law).24 Standardization is a complex process, comprising a series of 
steps and including the definition, implementation and exertion of standards 
(Timmermans and Epstein 2010). From the standpoint of EC, these steps al-
ways need to be embedded in a convention-based practice, because standards 
are regarded as incomplete in terms of their meaning (as any other kind of 
institution is). And the idea of a convention as a “pure standard” refers to con-
ventions without semantic content – as the example from Lewis of car-driving 
conventions mentioned above. (And consequently a convention with semantic 
content will be needed to exert the convention as standard.) 
Alain Desrosières (1998, 2001) identified two related phenomena, based on 
this kind of quantification as standardization: “metrology” and “adunation.” 
Metrology is the historical process of implementing the metrical measurement 
system (not only in the sciences but also in everyday life – for trade, time 
measurement, geography etc.).25 Adunation is the process of forming the 
(French) Nation by establishing nationwide standards (not all of them quantita-
tive ones).  
Standardization is not essentially bound to quantification. Standardization is 
possible as the definition of a routine or a procedure which can be exerted 
without numerical representations.  
But the process of standardization as the transformation of a convention into a 
numerical represented rule contradicts – at least to some degree – inherently some 
of the conventions identified by EC in the sense that these conventions resist this 
kind of transformation (as the domestic conventions or the convention of inspira-
tion). Their cognitive formats are different to numbers as representations. In-
                                                             
24  Laurent Thévenot has argued that standardization must be complemented by the personal 
regimes of engagement, so that standardization can be transmitted into individual routines 
and practices (Thévenot 2015). 
25  See for the history of metrology also the works of Eviatar Zerubavel (1981), William Cronon 
(1991), Eric Brian (1994), Ken Alder (2002) and Benoit Godin (2005). 
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stead, stories (about personalized examples and visual (iconic) representations 
are relevant for coordinations based on these conventions. 
5.  Perspectives for a Political Economy of Classification 
and Quantification 
The influential works of Alain Desrosières on the history of statistics were 
path-breaking for a comparative understanding of official statistics (Desrosières 
2008, 2008a, 2014). His work cannot be restricted to the history of statistical 
thinking in the sense of a history of the modern science of statistics. His notion 
of statistics correlates to a much wider idea of statistics as the science of (main-
ly numerical) state knowledge, of its institutions and of its representation. He 
integrated the analysis of statistical forms and societal organizations – as his-
torical forms of state, of the economy and of their interrelations.  
Table 3 summarizes different forms of the interrelation of state, markets and 
statistics in the course of the last centuries as they were identified by 
Desrosières (2011a). The five identified epochs articulated different forms of 
the political economy of classification(s) and quantification(s). It is important 
to understand the role of statistics in this table. These are dispositives requested 
by state administrations to fulfill their tasks – which vary depending on the 
different philosophies of the state and its role in the economy. 
So far, EC has mainly focused its analysis on processes of classification and 
quantification implemented and entertained by state institutions. Maybe this is 
a bias induced by the French social sciences, where the state was identified as 
an important generator of societal representations (Desrosières and Thévenot 
1979, 2002) and social groups (Bourdieu 1984; Salais et al. 1986; Boltanski 
1987). Alain Desrosières’ important typology can be characterized as state-
centered and developed from the perspective of official statistics. He studies the 
role of state-driven official statistics and its statistical forms for the economy. 
For this purpose his work will have an enduring relevance and impact.  
But nowadays, more and more scholars discuss developments and upcoming 
agencies for classifications and quantifications which are not controlled or 
entertained by state administrations. One catchword is “big data” (Mayer-
Schönberger and Cuiken 2013; Japec et al. 2015), denoting the automated 
search and economic exploitation of structures in huge amounts of data sets. 
This phenomenon becomes more virulent because of the ubiquity of the Inter-
net and the computerization of everyday social activities.  
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Table 3: The State, the Market and Statistics 
 Conceptualization of 
Society and of the 
Economy 
Mode of Action Forms of Statistics 
Engineer State 
Production and 
People  
(since the 17th 
century) 
hierarchically struc-
tured institution, 
rationally organized 
optimization under 
constraint; reduction 
of costs; planning; 
technocracy; 
demography; produc-
tion in physical 
quantity; input-
output-table; materi-
al balance 
Liberal State 
Trade and Prices 
(since the 18th 
century) 
physiocracy; an 
extensive market; free 
competition 
fight against corpo-
ratism; free-trade 
philosophy; anti-trust 
law 
statistics promoting 
market transparency 
Welfare State 
Waged Work and its 
Protection 
(since the end of 
19th century) 
the labor market has 
to be protected 
laws on working 
hours, accidents, 
unemployment; 
compulsory social 
insurance systems 
labor statistics; 
surveys of working 
households budgets; 
consumer price 
indexes 
Keynesian State 
Global Demand and 
its Components 
(since the 1940s) 
markets cannot 
function on its own 
and must be regulat-
ed at a global level 
managing the occa-
sional gap between 
global supply and 
demand through 
state policies 
national accounting; 
economic budgets 
Neoliberal State  
Polycentrism, 
Incentives, Bench-
marking 
(since the 1990s) 
an extensive market; 
free and undistorted 
competition 
moving from rights to 
incentive; turning 
administrations into 
agencies 
construction and use 
of indicators to 
evaluate and classify 
performance; bench-
marking 
Source: Desrosières (2011a, 45)26 
 
What is different to the world of official statistics in the era of neoliberalism is 
the increasing privatization of data collection and data analysis. The underly-
ing conventions for classification and quantification in the private sphere of the 
(Internet-)economy are invisible and therefore, no more accessible to public 
observation and deliberation.27 For example, private enterprises implement 
their own scoring systems to evaluate customers and clients, which are not 
visible for them and in many cases customers and clients don’t even know that 
there are evaluated this way (Fourcade and Healy 2013; Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier 2013). 
Desrosières already noticed processes in the “statistical chain,” which make 
the initially underlying conventions of statistics (as invented by official statisti-
cians) invisible and transform the interpretation of statistical figures from a 
                                                             
26  The table was slightly modified and shortened by the author. 
27  For a discussion of the contradictions and limits of neoliberalism from the standpoint of 
convention theory see William Davies (2014) and the review essay by Diaz-Bone (2016). 
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conventionalist representation to a “realistic” representations of social entities – 
the statistics from then are not being recognized any longer as based on con-
ventions (Desrosières 2009, 308).28  
Once quantification procedures are encoded and become routine, their prod-
ucts are objectified. They tend to become ’reality’ in an apparently irreversible 
way. The initial conventions are forgotten, the quantified object is naturalized 
and the use of the verb ‘to measure’ comes to mind or is written with no fur-
ther thought (Desrosières 2015, 334). 
And there is a social demand for such a realist representation of social entities 
by statistical figures, which are legitimated by an unchallenged institution 
(Desrosières 2009, 313). One can argue that the constellation of neoliberalism 
and computerization in time of the Internet will extend and accelerate the pro-
cesses which naturalize the products of quantification procedures. 
As Desrosières indicated in the characterization of the neoliberal state (see 
last row in Table 3), data production has become polycentric, placing the state 
in a new situation with private organizations (big enterprises and non-
government organizations, NGOs), who became data producers themselves, 
thereby questioning the legitimacy of the state monopoly for societal represen-
tations based on numerical data. The state has lost its position as the principle 
guarantor for symbolic power and has also lost its status as the “monopoly of 
legitimate symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 2015, 4).29  
Table 4 provides a first sketch of a more general frame, presenting in the 
columns four ideal types of situations in which classification and quantification 
can be executed. 
The perspective to understand these situations is the perspective of coordi-
nating actors, not the one of official statistics in relation to the state and to the 
economy – as in Table 3. The four situations represent four possible and own 
standing “centers” or situations for classifying and quantifying processes which 
emerge out of actor’s coordination. Here, the claim is not that the table lists all 
possible situations. But the presented situations are characterized by a maxi-
mum of differences in regard to aspects discussed so far – and they should be 
understood as ideal types which do not occur in pure form in reality. 
  
                                                             
28  For the concept of statistical chain see: Laurent Thévenot (1983), Alain Desrosières (2007) 
and Diaz-Bone (2016). 
29  The causes for this loss of the state’s position are also located on the supra-national level as 
Robert Salais (2013) has analyzed in his history of the origination of the European Union. 
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Table 4: Four Situations of Classification and Quantification  
 Centralistic State Situation 
Deliberative, 
Pluralistic 
Public Situation
Free Market 
Situation 
Private 
Monopolistic 
Situation 
Example 
officialdom, 
state admin-
istration 
social move-
ments, NGOs 
stock 
exchange 
Internet 
monopoly 
Classification or quanti-
fication legitimated by 
monopoly of symbolic 
power 
yes no no no 
Power monopoly for 
implementation of 
classification or quanti-
fication 
yes no no yes 
Classification or quanti-
fication orientation 
towards a common good 
yes yes yes no 
Visible convention(s) of 
classification or quanti-
fication 
yes yes yes no 
Debatable/discussable 
conventions no yes no no 
Acceptance for a plural-
istic constellation of 
classification or quanti-
fication 
no yes no yes 
National constraint of 
classification or quanti-
fication  
yes no no no 
State convention  external state situated state absent state absent state 
 
Alain Desrosières (2015) has coined the notion of “retroaction,” which denotes 
the public questioning of official statistics by social groups which are con-
cerned by quantification in a devaluing (discriminating) way.30 Statistics not 
only has become an object of critique, but has become a dispositive of social 
critique as well (Desrosières 2014a).31 All in all, neoliberalism cannot be re-
duced to one convention or assigned as denominator to a whole socio-
economic epoch. All four situations (and maybe some more) have occurred in 
modern societies over a few hundred years, but in different constellations, and 
                                                             
30  Wendy Espeland and Michael Sauder (2007) have applied the concept of “reactivity” in their 
analysis of actor’s reaction to rankings. Annick Bourguignon and Eve Chiapello (2005) 
worked on the role of criticism in the processes of implementing quantitative measurements 
as performance evaluation systems. Antoine Lyon-Caen and Joëlle Affichard (2005) analyzed 
the implementation of the Open Method of Coordination and processes of upcoming re-
sistance to it. 
31  See also the French approach of “Statactivisme” (Didier and Tasset 2013; Bruno et al. 2014; 
Bruno et al. 2014a). 
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they have varying impact in different social spheres. Seen from the standpoint 
of coordinating actors, different conventions of the state – as they were intro-
duced by Michal Storper and Robert Salais (Storper and Salais 1997; Salais 
2015) – can be adequate frames in the definition of the situation, the collective 
intentionality and the common good. The notion “convention of the state” is 
different from the state-centered perspective which takes the state (its admin-
istrations and its legitimacy) as granted. The “external state” is actor’s expecta-
tions to have state administration to intervene and to solve the problem of co-
ordination. The “absent state” is actor’s expectation that the state will do noth-
nothing concerning the coordination and its outcome. The “situated state” is a 
frame for actors who know that they can pursue the common good and only in 
case of failure they expect the state to intervene (not knowing in which man-
ner). These different interpretations of “the state” will result in different ways, 
how to proceed quantifications. 
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